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Toward an Account of Gender Identity
The most widely accepted definition of gender identity characterises it as 'a sense of oneself as a man, woman, or some other gender'.[2] It will be immediately apparent to the reader that this 'folk' definition is not complete until some account is offered of what it is to have a sense of oneself as 'a man, woman, or some other gender'. This is where the folk definition begins to run into difficulties: no such account is usually offered as part of the definition, and there is no consensus on what kind of account might be appropriate. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that many people who use the language of gender identity hold an understanding of what it is to be a 'man, woman, or some other gender' that is highly unsuited to supplementing the folk definition of gender identity. This is the view that gender terms such as 'man' and 'woman' ought to be understood in terms of gender identity: to be a man is to identify as a man (or, to have a male gender identity);[3] to be a woman is to identify as a woman (or, to have a female gender identity); to be a non-binary person is to identify as non-binary (or, to have a non-binary gender identity), and so on. The combination of this view with the folk definition of gender identity gives rise to a circularity: someone who asks what it means to say that a certain person 'has a female gender identity' will be told that it means that that person has a sense of herself 'as a woman'-but if the questioner then asks what a 'woman' is, they will be told that a woman is 'a person with a female gender identity'. Thus, the questioner is none the wiser as to what it means to have a female gender identity.
I do not intend here to take a stance on whether or not gender terms should be used, in general, primarily to refer to gender identity.[4] The point I wish to make is that even someone who thinks that gender terms should in general refer to gender identity must, on pain of circularity, allow that in the context of the definition of gender identity, the idea of having a sense of oneself 'as a man, woman or some other gender' must be explained without reference to gender identity. The current lack of any widely accepted explanation of this idea, and the resulting circularity in the folk concept of gender identity, is a problem from the point of view of trans rights campaigners. It would, from that perspective, be beneficial to be able to explain what gender identity is to people who do not already understand the concept, in order that they can participate in movements for trans rights in an informed way.
The present moment, at which the concept of gender identity is rapidly permeating public consciousness, presents a particularly good opportunity for establishing a widespread and sound understanding. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, however, it is necessary to have a clear and non-circular definition of gender identity. Although, as we have seen, the folk concept of gender identity is not adequate in this regard, the fact that there is widespread agreement on at least some of the work that the concept of gender identity ought to be able to do offers a promising starting point for expanding on the folk definition. Put simply, the thought is this: since we know something about how trans rights movements need to use the concept of gender identity, we can assess various possible ways of extending the folk definition in terms of how well suited they are to those uses, with a view to selecting the one that is best able to do the required work. This is my aim in this paper.
quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0005.027/--toward-an-account-of-gender-identity