Rataxes skrev 2022-01-22 16:33:04 följande:
Allt för Nordstream 2 och gasleveranser.
Jag erinrar mig ett annat tillfälle då Tyskland lismade för Ryssland, det slutade inte väl.
Kallar du Molotov-Ribbentroppakten ett tyskt lismande för Ryssland? Det slutatade tack och lov väl med att Nazistyskland förgjordes och att de baltiska staterna fick tillbaks sin frihet efter att sovjet föll - även om det finns gott om nyssnazister som härjar runt med en märklig vurm för auktoritära ledare, Putin inräknad bland dessa ledare.
Om det är MT-pakten du tänker på verkar du ha fått det hela rejält om bakfoten om vem som lismande för vem
www.levandehistoria.se/fakta-om-forintelsen/andra-varldskriget/aren-fore-krigsutbrottet/molotov-ribbentroppakten1939
"Den 23 augusti 1939 ingick Tyskland och Sovjetunionen ett avtal om att inte angripa varandra militärt. Det skrevs under i Moskva av Sovjetunionens utrikesminister Vjatjeslav Molotov och Tysklands utrikesminister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Det kallas därför ofta Molotov-Ribbentroppakten. Nyheten om den tysk-sovjetiska icke-angreppspakten var oväntad för övriga världen. Under hela 1930-talet hade Hitler talat om det kommunistiska Sovjetunionen som en huvudfiende.
Hitlers främsta motiv till pakten var att kunna anfalla Polen utan att riskera ett tvåfrontskrig med både västmakterna och Sovjetunionen. Sovjetunionens ledare, Josef Stalin, hade försökt att bilda ett försvarsförbund med Storbritannien och Frankrike, men detta hade misslyckats. Avtalet med Tyskland blev en väg ut ur Sovjetunionens utrikespolitiska isolering.
Till icke-angreppspakten hörde också ett hemligt avtal. Det gick ut på att Tyskland och Sovjetunionen delade upp Östeuropa mellan sig. Östra Polen, Finland, Estland, Lettland och Bessarabien tillföll Sovjetunionens. Västra Polen och Litauen tillföll Tyskland. I slutet av september 1939 fick dock Sovjetunionen fria händer även i Litauen."
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact
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Hitler's fierce anti-Soviet rhetoric was one of the reasons that Britain and France decided that Soviet participation in the 1938 Munich Conference on Czechoslovakia would be both dangerous and useless.[31] In the Munich Agreement that followed[32] the conference agreed to a German annexation of part of Czechoslovakia in late 1938, but in early 1939 it had been completely dissolved.[33] The policy of appeasement toward Germany was conducted by the governments of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier.[34] The policy immediately raised the question of whether the Soviet Union could avoid being next on Hitler's list.[35] The Soviet leadership believed that the West wanted to encourage German aggression in the East[36] and to stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany in the hope that Germany and the Soviet Union would wear each other out and put an end to both regimes.[37]For Germany, an autarkic economic approach and an alliance with Britain were impossible and so closer relations with the Soviet Union to obtain raw materials became necessary.[38] Besides economic reasons, an expected British blockade during a war would also create massive shortages for Germany in a number of key raw materials.[39] After the Munich Agreement, the resulting increase in German military supply needs and Soviet demands for military machinery made talks between the two countries occur from late 1938 to March 1939.[40] Also, the third Soviet five-year plan required new infusions of technology and industrial equipment.[38][41][clarification needed] German war planners had estimated serious shortfalls of raw materials if Germany entered a war without the Soviet supply.[42]
On 31 March 1939, in response to Germany's defiance of the Munich Agreement and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,[43] Britain pledged its support and that of France to guarantee the independence of Poland, Belgium, Romania, Greece and Turkey.[44] On 6 April, Poland and Britain agreed to formalise the guarantee as a military alliance, pending negotiations.[45] On 28 April, Hitler denounced the 1934 German–Polish declaration of non-aggression and the 1935 Anglo–German Naval Agreement.[46]
In mid-March 1939, attempting to contain Hitler's expansionism, the Soviet Union, Britain and France started to trade a flurry of suggestions and counterplans on a potential political and military agreement.[47][48] Informal consultations started in April, but the main negotiations began only in May.[48] Meanwhile, throughout early 1939, Germany had secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer better terms for a political agreement than could Britain and France.[49][50][51]
The Soviet Union, which feared Western powers and the possibility of "capitalist encirclements", had little hope either of preventing war and wanted nothing less than an ironclad military alliance with France and Britain[52] to provide guaranteed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany.[53] Stalin's adherence to the collective security line was thus purely conditional.[54] Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and that since the Soviet Union was so weakened by the Great Purge[55] that it could not be a main military participant.[53] Many military sources[clarification needed] were at variance with the last point, especially after the Soviet victories over the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Manchuria.[56] France was more anxious to find an agreement with the Soviet Union than Britain was. As a continental power, France was more willing to make concessions and more fearful of the dangers of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany.[57] The contrasting attitudes partly explain why the Soviets have often been charged with playing a double game in 1939 of carrying on open negotiations for an alliance with Britain and France but secretly considering propositions from Germany.[57]
By the end of May, drafts had been formally presented.[48] In mid-June, the main tripartite negotiations started.[58] Discussions were focused on potential guarantees to Central and Eastern Europe in the case of German aggression.[59] The Soviets proposed to consider that a political turn towards Germany by the Baltic states would constitute an "indirect aggression" towards the Soviet Union.[60] Britain opposed such proposals because they feared the Soviets' proposed language would justify a Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany.[61][62] The discussion of a definition of "indirect aggression" became one of the sticking points between the parties, and by mid-July, the tripartite political negotiations effectively stalled while the parties agreed to start negotiations on a military agreement, which the Soviets insisted had to be reached at the same time as any political agreement.[63] One day before the military negotiations began, the Soviet Politburo pessimistically expected the coming negotiations to go nowhere and formally decided to consider German proposals seriously.[64] The military negotiations began on 12 August in Moscow, with a British delegation headed by the retired admiral Sir Reginald Drax, French delegation headed by General Aimé Doumenc and the Soviet delegation headed by Kliment Voroshilov, the commissar of defence, and Boris Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff. Without written credentials, Drax was not authorised to guarantee anything to the Soviet Union and had been instructed by the British government to prolong the discussions as long as possible and to avoid answering the question of whether Poland would agree to permit Soviet troops to enter the country if the Germans invaded.[65] As the negotiations failed, a great opportunity to prevent the German aggression was probably lost.[66]"
